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THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS OF CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES: SOME COMPARISONS*

O

THE HONOuRABLE BoiA LASKIN**

UR two countries are federations, created under written constitutions.' Each
has a national government with a bicameral legislature and each has a
national Supreme Court. Each has constituent local units called Provinces and
States respectively, and these, too,, have their own legislatures and their own
courts. Law-making power is distributed in Canada as in the United States between the national and local legislatures. These common features, formally stated
only, suggest that we are organized for governmental activity in much the same
way. It would be misleading, however, to insist that you can learn much about
the Canadian constitutional system from a study of your own; or that we in
Canada could learn much about your system of government by studying our
scheme of organization and operation. I propose to consider four illustrative
matters to demonstrate how little the form corresponds with the reality. I shall
briefly consider (1) our respective court systems; (2) our respective Supreme
Courts; (3) our respective legal responses to civil liberties issues; and (4) our
respective legal conceptions of the interaction of national and local power.
The American system of federal district courts and federal circuit courts of
appeal, operating alongside state courts, and with an assured jurisdiction based
in large part on diversity of citizenship, is unknown in Canada and, indeed, could
not constitutionally be established on such a jurisdictional foundation. The
superior courts of first instance and of appeal in my country are primarily provincial courts, but there is this peculiarity; although they are established by the
respective provinces, the judges who man them are appointed and paid by the
federal government.2 Therefore, there must be practical co-operation between
the two levels of government (which cannot be legally coerced) in order to effect
an increase in the number of superior court judges. The same situation prevails
with respect to the provincial district and county courts. Magistrates, juvenile
and family court judges (considered as presiding over courts of inferior jurisdiction) are not subject to this constitutional division of authority; they are appointed and paid by the provinces in which they serve.3
Provincial courts of whatever dignity exercise jurisdiction in both federal
* Extended text of portions of an address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the
Harvard Law School Association of Western New York on December 7, 1966.
** Justice, Court of Appeal of Ontario.
1. In Canada, the written constitution is the British North America Act, 1867, 30 &
31 Vict., c. 3 [hereinafter cited B.N.A. Act], a British statute which contains no provision
for its amendment, but which has been amended frequently by the United Kingdom Parliament at the behest of the Canadian government. The conventional procedure is to forward
a joint address of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, with the text of the desired amendment. For a history of the attempts, so far unsuccessful, to fashion a domestic
amending procedure, see Favreau, The Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (1965
Doc. No. 964).
2. B.N.A. Act, §§ 92(14), 96, 100.
3. See Reference re Adoption Act, [1938] Can. Sup. Ct. 398, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 497.
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and provincial areas of legislative authority. This is, first, because it is open
to the national Parliament to repose jurisdiction in federal matters in the provincial courts and in the judges thereof; 4 the classic illustration is in respect of
the criminal law, which is included among the national Parliament's exclusive
powers, and Parliament has chosen to use provincial magistrates as well as
county, district and superior court judges of the provincial courts, to administer
the federal Criminal Code. Second, there is a well-accepted presumption-perhaps
more properly a rule of construction-that where federal legislation invites the
exercise of jurisdiction by a court and no special tribunal is constituted or
designated, it falls to be exercised by the ordinary provincial courts, generally
the superior courts. 5
The picture I have drawn would not be complete without pointing out that
under our Constitution the national Parliament has the power to establish its
own system of courts for the adjudication of controversies arising out of matters
within Parliament's legislative power. 6 It has done this sparingly; we have an
Exchequer Court of Canada which deals to a large extent with claims by and
against the federal Crown (government), and also has jurisdiction in federal tax
matters. 7 It also has admiralty jurisdiction but it is assisted in this respect by
District Judges in Admiralty who are, as a rule, persons already members of
provincial courts.8 Parliament could similarly establish federal divorce courts
since "marriage and divorce" (but not solemnization of marriage) is within the
catalogue of exclusive federal legislative powers. Generally, the national Parliament has been content to have the provincial courts pass on litigible issues arising
under federal legislation; this is true, for example, in the fields of banking,
bankruptcy and insolvency, and commercial paper.
It follows from what I have said that there is no place in Canadian constitutional law for such a principle as that in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.0 A dual system
of courts is constitutionally possible in Canada; but the duality would not permit
the application of both federal law and local (provincial) law in the federal
courts, as is the case in the United States. Any federal courts established in
Canada-and I do not here include the national Supreme Court, to which different considerations apply-are constitutionally limited to the application of
federal law only. However, it should be pointed out that instances are multiplying where the federal law to be applied is in reality provincial law referentially
4. See In re Vancini, 34 Can. Sup. Ct. 621 (1904).
5. Board v. Board, [1919] A.C. 956, 48 D.L.R. 13. It would appear to be competent
also to a provincial legislature, in the absence of federal directing legislation, to give express
jurisdiction to provincial courts to process causes of action arising under federal legislation.
See Attorney-Gen. for British Columbia v. McKenzie, [1965] Can. Sup. Ct. 490, 51 D.L.R.
2d 623.
6. B.N.A. Act, § 101; see also Valin v. Langlois, 3 Can. Sup. Ct. 1 (1879), leave to
appeal denied, 5 App. Cas. 115 (1879).
7. Exchequer Court Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 98 (1952); Income Tax Act, Can. Rev.
Stat. c. 148, § 60 (1952).
8. Admiralty Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 1 (1952).
9.

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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adopted or incorporated where there has been no statutory definition of the
applicable federal law. 10 It is perhaps an obvious comment that the common law
must be regarded as "federalized" for the purpose of its relevant application in
a federal court of original jurisdiction such as the Exchequer Court.
Our respective national Supreme Courts also offer significant contrasts in
their organization and jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Canada is a statutory
court, created in 1875 by the Parliament of Canada and vested by it with appellate jurisdiction which has been varied from time to time." The Supreme
Court of the United States, on the other hand, is a constitutional court in the
sense that its existence and jurisdiction are derived from the Constitution. The
Canadian Supreme Court came into existence under power given to the national
Parliament to "provide for the constitution, maintenance and organization of a
general court of appeal for Canada."' 2 Until the passage of the Statute of Westminister in 1931, it was constitutionally impossible for Parliament to make the
Supreme Court the ultimate, final appellate court for Canadian causes through
ouster of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council.' 3 Appeals to the latter were not
abolished until 1949, and prior to this time the Supreme Court remained at best
a penultimate appellate court which could neither command appeals nor control
4
further appeals to the Privy Council.'
However, from the beginning, Parliament's power to create a "general court
of appeal" for Canada was construed to mean that Parliament alone could determine (or, of course, delegate to the Supreme Court to determine) the rights of
appeal to the Supreme Court, and the conditions which must be met to launch
an appeal. This power extended to allowing an appeal in purely provincial matters, even though by provincial legislation the judgments of the highest provincial
court were declared to be final and not subject to further appeal.' 5 Briefly stated,
the Parliament of Canada can endow the Canadian Supreme Court with the
widest appellate authority in all Canadian causes, whether arising from federal
or provincial legislation, and it is, of course, now the final appellate court.
There is no constitutional provision in Canada, as there is in the United
States, to empower the Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdiction in disputes
10. See the discussion in Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law 821-22 (3d ed. 1966).
Cf. Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923).
11. Supreme Court Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 259 (1952), as amended, Can. Rev. Stat.
c. 335 (1952), [1956) Can. Stat. c. 48.
12. B.N.A. Act, § 101.
13. Until the passing of this statute by the United Kingdom, Canada could not validly
exclude the application thereto of British legislation, such as the Privy Council Appeal Acts
of 1833 and 1844, which applied to British colonies; there was also some doubt prior to
1931 whether Canada could validly enact extraterritorial legislation. On the question of
Privy Council appeals, see British Coal Corp. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500 [19353 3
D.L.R. 401; Attorney-Gen. for Ontario v. Attorney-Gen. for Canada, [1947] A.C. 127,
[1947] 1 D.L.R. 80.
14. Prior to such abolition by federal legislation, it was open to litigants to go directly
to the Privy Council from provincial appellate courts, either as of right or by special leave.
15. See Crown Grain Co. v. Day, [1908] A.C. 504.
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between the local units.16 To some extent this deficiency has been overcome
through resort to the "reference," but only so far as constitutional issues between
Canada and one or more of the provinces are concerned. 17 There is a dormant
statutory jurisdiction by consent in the Exchequer Court of Canada to entertain
disputes between Canada and a province or between two provinces. 18 It does
not appear that the absence of such a provision as appears in Article III, section
2, of the Constitution of the United States, defining the jurisdictional power of
the United States Supreme Court, has given rise to any difficulties in Canada.
Like the American Supreme Court, the Canadian Court consists of nine
judges. They are, of course, federal appointees, and both statute and convention
dictate their selection. By statute, at least three must be from the Bar of Quebec;' 9 by convention no less than three come from the Bar of Ontario. Of the
remaining three places, two are filled by appointees from the bars of the four
provinces west of Ontario, and one is filled by a person from the bars of the
four Atlantic provinces east of Quebec.
The Supreme Court of the United States always sits in hearings on the
merits as a full Court of nine (unless by reason of illness or self-disqualification
the number is reduced in particular cases). The Canadian Supreme Court may
sit as a bench of five or seven or nine, depending on how the Chief Justice
(presumably in consultation with his colleagues) decides to deploy his manpower.
Five is a quorum, and most cases are heard by five-judge courts.20 In capital and
constitutional cases the likelihood is that the full bench will sit or at least a
seven-judge court will be set up, but this has not been invariably true. Unlike
the case in the United States Supreme Court, there is great latitude of oral
argument in the Supreme Court of Canada (as, indeed, there is in all provincial
appellate courts). There is no predetermined time limit. Although written factums ("briefs" in the literal sense) are required in appellate proceedings, they
are not so much fully-fleshed arguments as they are succinct statements of the
facts and terse assertions of the law intended to be argued, reinforced by citation
of authorities without much elaboration or quotation, if any. In many cases,
judgment will be given from the bench at the conclusion of the argument or
after a short recess for deliberation. If judgment is to be reserved, counsel are so
told, and reasons are handed down in due course, as happens in the Supreme
Court of the United States. There is no open reading of the opinions as in the
United States Supreme Court.
The Judges of the Supreme Court of Canada do their own work, unaided
by law clerks who are so much a part of the judicial forces in the appellate courts
16.

See the discussion in Ontario v. Canada, 42 Can. Sup. Ct. 1, 118-19 (1909), affd,

[1910] A.C. 637.

17. Supreme Court Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 259, § 55 (1952). The "reference" authority goes beyond constitutional issues but has not, by and large, been utilized beyond
them.
18. Exchequer Court Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 98, § 30 (1952).
19. Supreme Court Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 259, § 6 (1952).
20. Supreme Court Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 259, § 25 (1952).
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of the United States. In the court of which I am a member, consisting of ten
appeal judges who sit in panels of three or five, but never in a larger number,
there is one law clerk to serve the members of the court. Of course, sitting in
panels as we do, we usually have two three-judge courts sitting concurrently
each week, and in this way have been able to dispose of, roughly, close to 600
cases (civil and criminal) per year. In order to survive, it is necessary that we
deliver judgment from the bench orally at the conclusion of argument (or very
soon after) in the substantial majority of the cases heard. Because oral argument by counsel is not limited in advance, we can explore quite freely and deeply
the ramifications of a case by question and answer; and in this way we try to
ensure that justice is done albeit disposition may be made on the spot. I should
add that the effectiveness of this mode of operation depends on previous preparation by the Appeal Court Judges; there is no surcease from homework during
the periods of sitting.
I am told, but the story may be apocryphal, that Professor Paul Freund was
wont to tell his classes that if the mythical man from Mars came to Earth and
sought a quick run-down on life in the United States, he should properly be
directed to a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. I am not certain that
there is any office holder in Canada, judicial or other, to whom I could direct
him. I use this illustration to emphasize my impression of the extent to which
issues in American social and economic life are justiciable. We are just as lawridden as you are, but we are not as subject to the judicial ordering of our lives.
A Baker v. Carts l reapportionment direction could not occur in Canada under
our present Constitution; nor would our judiciary be able to strike down provincial poll tax legislation applicable to provincial and municipal elections;2 it
could construe but not destroy. There is no constitutional Bill of. Rights in
Canada to support such exercise of judicial power.
I come then to consider the ways in which our respective countries and,
especially our respective national Supreme Courts, deal with civil liberties issues.
In Canada, we espouse the British tradition, modfied only by the scheme of
distribution of legislative power between the Dominion as a whole and the provinces and by a few limited constitutional guarantees; for example, in respect of
separate schools and the use of the French as well as the English language in

23
the federal legislature and courts and in the legislature and courts of Quebec.

The British tradition in connection with civil liberties (and I speak mainly of
the political freedoms) has a political and a legal component. The political component rests on a conventional development which produced a tradition of
freedom, and it is reinforced by the proposition that conduct or activity needs
no previous justification where there is no legal prohibition. Alongside is the
legal component, the supremacy of Parliament, which means that civil liberties
are at the mercy of contrary legislation; but the battle here would be fought on
21.

369 U.S. 186 (1962) ; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

22. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
23. B.N.A. Act, §§ 93, 133.
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the political front; the courts' role is the limited one of construction of the
legislation. There is no such doctrine in Canada as there is in the United States
that certain kinds of governmental or other official action, whether federal or
state, may be struck down as unconstitutional because offensive to the Bill of
Rights in the American Constitution. In Canada, the legal question is, in general,
which level of government (local or national) has the constitutional power to
deal with civil liberty matters. It follows, of course, that just as a particular
level of government may limit, equally it may reinforce or protect civil liberties.
I propose to take some examples based on the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution.2 4 The right to counsel in Canada must depend on
affirmative legislation, not on constitutional obligation; 25 or, at the most, would
depend on the courts' conception of the proprieties of the administration of
justice where there was no directing legislation on the matter. There is not as
yet, nor is there likely to be in Canada, any such constitutionally-based legal
rule as was announced in Miranda v. Arizona,28 conditioning the admissibility
of confessions to the police on the availability of the advice of counsel prior to
interrogation. Such a rule could conceivably come as a common law development
but not as a constitutional imperative; and even if it came, it could be abrogated
by legislation or, at least modified, as was done with the common law rule against
self-crimination 2 7 In Canada, we still have the rule, contrary to some of the
search and seizure cases in your country, that evidence in a criminal case is
admissible if relevant, no matter how illegally obtainedP8 It is subject only to
the qualification of the trial judge's discretion in dealing with the admissibility
of evidence; but, even so, legislation could validly control that discretion. I have
already indicated that in Canada there is no constitutional barrier to poll tax
legislation. The struggle against it would have to be waged on the political front,
not on any legal front.
The free speech area offers similar contrasts. With us, punishable obscenity,
for example, depends on statutory definition alone, not on constitutional appraisal
which must safeguard the guarantee of freedom of speech. 0 So too with respect
to prayers in public schools and flag salutes.3 0 Here, however, a caveat is
necessary because of a developing line of decision which points to federal
jurisdiction in relation to religious observance, and perhaps also in relation to
prescription of religious exercises; 31 but, despite this, there may still be room
for the exercise of provincial power relative to education which may competently
24. I do not, of course, ignore the associated relevance of the due process clause.
25. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962).
26. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
27. See Canada Evidence Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 307, § 5 (1952).
28. See Rex v. Honan, 26 Ont. L.R. 484, 6 D.L.R. 276 (Ct. App. 1912).
29. Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), with Brodie v. The Queen,
[19623 Can. Sup. Ct. 681, 32 D.L.R.2d 507.
30. Compare West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), with Donald
v. Hamilton Bd. of Educ., [1945] Ont. 518, [1945] 3 D.L.R. 424 (Ct. App.).
31. See Henry Birks & Sons (Montreal) Ltd. v. Montreal, [1955] Can. Sup Ct. 799,
[19551 5 D.L.R. 321.
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cover those matters, at least in the absence of preclusive federal legislation. The
separation of church and state is in Canada a matter of political tradition which
may at any time be modified or even evaded completely by legislation. As in
other matters, the constitutional question here concerns the determination only of
the level of government by which such legislation may be commanded. The
same comment may be made in respect of racial discrimination. In particular
aspects or connections, it may be a matter for both Parliament and the provincial legislatures; for example, for the former as a possible subject of the criminal
law and for the latter as a focus of fair employment practices governing busi32
nesses within provincial regulatory control.
Canada has had a Bill of Rights since 1960. 3 It is purely statutory: a
federal measure at once declaratory or hortatory, and operating as a direction to
the courts to interpret federal legislation consistently with due regard for the
traditional political and legal freedoms (as spelled out in the enactment), and
also admonishing Parliament itself not to pass legislation in derogation of its
terms. It has, in the main, been regarded by the courts, in experience to date, as
expressing a rule of construction and thus ineffective to modify legislation which
is enacted in contrary terms. 34 A recent judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada, Robertson & Rosetanni v. The Queen,3 5 proceeded on the view that it
could have a superseding effect upon existing legislation offensive to its terms,
but (with one Judge dissenting) the Court avoided this effect by a narrow
reading of freedom of religion.
The case is worth a brief discussion. It involved a prosecution of a bowling
alley operator for carrying on his business in breach of The Lord's Day Act, a
federal statute enacted in 1906. The Act is posited on Christian tenets and, with
certain exceptions, prohibits the carrying on of business on Sunday. Its constitutional underpinning was the federal criminal law power, interpreted to embrace
prohibitory legislation to ensure respect for religious profession.3 6 Under the
present course of constitutional decision in Canada, the federal Parliament would
not be competent to enact general Sunday observance legislation on the basis of a
secular purpose of repose and recreation. In other words, the grounds on which
the recent line of cases on state Sunday observance legislation were determined
by the United States Supreme Court 37 could not be used for a federal Sunday
observance measure in Canada. (It is possibly open to the provinces to enact
such legislation on such a basis, but it would be safer to make it part of a more
comprehensive regulatory statute fixing days or hours of work in enterprises
32. There are now eight provinces with both fair employment practices legislation and
fair accommodation practices legislation. The Parliament of Canada is presently considering criminal legislation to implement the Dep't of Justice of Canada, Report of a Special
Committee on Hate Propagandain Canada (1966 Doc. No. 1590).
33. E1960] Can. Stat. c. 44.
34. See generally Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights (1966).
35. [19631 Can. Sup. Ct. 651, 41 D.L.R.2d 485.
36. See Attorney-Gen. for Ontario v. Hamilton St. Ry., [19031 A.C. 524; In re Legislation Respecting Abstention From Labour on Sunday, 35 Can. Supt. Ct. 581 (1905).
37. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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under provincial jurisdiction.) 38 Therefore, given the fact that the Lord's Day
Act had a sectarian object, could it stand in the face of the injunction in the
Canadian Bill of Rights that federal legislation should be "construed and applied" so as not to abridge, inter alia, freedom of religion? Because the Supreme
Court majority found the two measures compatible it did not, strictly speaking,
have to decide the legal consequence of their incompatibility. Reconciliation of
the two enactments was based substantially on the view that freedom of religion
under the Canadian Bill of Rights would be abridged only by federal legislation
imposing religious observances on unwilling persons or restraining them in
professing their own faith. Conceding that the Lord's Day Act safeguarded the
sanctity of Sunday as a Christian tenet, the Supreme Court majority saw it as
having merely a secular business consequence on those who did not believe in
Sunday observance. To a degree, the Supreme Court majority rested on one of
the two parts of the American constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. It
appears that the Canadian Bill of Rights does not touch federal legislation respecting "an establishment of religion" but only federal legislation "prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. '39 If so, this view runs counter to an earlier expression
of opinion in the Supreme Court (albeit made in another context) that "all
religions are on an equal footing." 40
I come, finally, to consider the way in which national and local law-making
powers interact in our two countries; and I propose to concentrate on the respective commerce powers of our national governments. They are significant not
only in themselves as a base for national social and economic policies, but they
also represent (apart from the Bill of Rights in each of our two countries) the
starkest contrasts in our operating federalisms. Under the Canadian Constitution,
federal power is exclusive in relation to "the regulation of trade and commerce."' 1
These words, taken alone, are wider in their import than the terms in which the
Congress is vested with the comparable authority, namely, commerce among
the states and with foreign countries. It was noted quite early in Canadian
constitutional adjudication that no distinction was made under the commerce
power between intraprovincial and extraprovincial transactions in trade or
commerce; 42 but the actual course of interpretation has resulted in that distinction being drawn very severely; so severely, indeed, as to preclude any effective
exercise of the power on any total market or business basis; intraprovincial transactions in goods or intraprovincial business relations could not be swept into
federal jurisdiction even if they constituted the minutest percentage of an
otherwise wholly interprovincial or international operation. 43 No such theory as
the flow of commerce or of activity affecting commerce has obtained in Canada
38. See Lieberman v. The Queen, [1963] Can. Sup. Ct. 643, 41 D.L.R.2d 125.
39. See generally Barron, Sunday in North America, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 42 (1965);
Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 25 (1962).
40. Chaput v. Romain, (1955] Can. Sup. Ct. 834, 840, 1 D.L.R.2d 241, 246.
41. B.N.A. Act, § 91(2).
42. Severn v. The Queen, 2 Can. Sup. Ct. 70, 104 (1878).
43. See generally Smith, The Commerce Power in Canada and the United States (1963).
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as it has in the United States. There is no NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp." principle in Canada respecting federal regulatory control over labor
relations; no United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n 45 doctrine to
support federal regulation of insurance; no Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n4 6 case to provide a basis for federal regulation of the securities business; no United States v. Darby47 doctrine to justify general federal fair
labor standards legislation; no such constitutional support for an agricultural
policy covering both the interstate and interrelated local market as was supplied
48
for the United States by such cases as United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.
9
and Wickard v. Filburn. In short, we are in Canada very far from the conception of a commerce power which the late Justice Murphy said was "as broad as
the economic needs of the nation." 50
This is not the occasion for considering whether the very wide interpretation
of the commerce clause by your Supreme Court has not created strains for your
federalism as acute as the narrow interpretation of our commerce clause has
created for our brand of federalism. We would on such a consideration be
trading views whether it is healthier that the center be very strong or very weak
or whether, overall, judicial interpretation in our respective countries has divined
the proper balance between local and national authority. It is inuch too large a
subject, in any event, to intrude in this sketch. I think it more desirable that I
place the judicial interpretation of the Canadian commerce power in context,
lest I leave a misleading picture of an utterly weak federal government.
One of the reasons for the attenuated view taken of our commerce power
has been the presence in our Constitution of other specified federal powers which
in your country have been treated as aspects of your commerce power; for
example, banks and banking, bankruptcy and insolvency, patents and copyrights,
navigation and shipping, interprovincial and international transport and communication. 5' These specifics produced the "collocation" argument for a reduction in the literal reach of the words "the regulation of trade and commerce." 52
The argument was fed also by a common law disposition towards the words
"property and civil rights in the Province," being one of the main heads of
exclusive power assigned to the provincial legislatures. 53 Nonetheless, there are
some recent indications of judicial inclination to expand the hitherto narrow
44. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
45. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
46. 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
47. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
48. 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
49. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

50. American Power &Light Co. v. Securities &Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946).

51. I do not wish to be misunderstood as saying that in the United States all these
matters rest solely on the commerce power; see, e.g., First Nat'1 Bank of Logan v. Walker
Bank &Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 256 (1966) (banking) ; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (patents
and copyrights).
See Citizens Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96, 112 (1881).
See, e.g., Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Prod. Bd., [1938] A. C. 708, 719,
[1938] 4 D.L.R. 81, 85.
52.
53.
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scope of the Canadian commerce power.54 These indications have come in
decisions on provincial legislation because federal initiative has not been bold,
owing to a long history of frustration. The national government found it more
expedient to rely on its transportation and communication authority, on its
banking power, on its criminal law power, and particularly on its ample taxing
(and concomitant spending) power to promote national social and economic
policies not realizable directly through its commerce power.
Wide as these powers are, either individually or collectively, they do not
add up to displacement of primary provincial regulatory authority in social
welfare and in education. 55 These are fields which must be heavily financed; and,
understandably, the main strain in Dominion-provincial relations today, aside
from the special problems raised by the aspirations of Quebec, is in conflicting
views on taxing powers and proper division of tax revenuesP0 A Royal Commission report on these and related matters is imminent. In the meantime,
insistence by Quebec and other provinces that they be left alone to discharge
their constitutional responsibilities, without federal intrusion through the use of
conditional grants, has resulted in the dismantling of some federal-provincial
cooperative arrangements and in consequential claims by the provinces for more
unearmarked grants.
A particular illustration comes from the field of higher education. There is
no national office of education in Canada as there is in the United States, but the
national government had been making per capita grants to universities, using
the Association of the Universities and Colleges of Canada as the distributing
agency, except in Quebec where a different formula of support was worked out
some years ago.58 Recently the general policy was changed. The national government has now abandoned its role of direct support by reducing the federal'
tax bite and yielding the money to the provinces for their use for education in
such manner as they see fit. There is still some federal support for research; but
what has been done in withdrawal of direct support for higher education appears
to be founded on the principle that the Dominion should not use its taxing and
spending power as a means of indirect regulation of fields in which constitutionally it has no direct regulatory authority. This is a political, not a legal constitu54. Regina v. Klassen, 20 D.L.R.2d 406 (Man. Ct. App.); leave to appeal denied,
[1959) Can. Sup. Ct. ix; Reader's Digest Ass'n (Canada) Ltd. v. Attorney-Gen. for Canada,
59 D.L.R.2d 54 (Que. Q.B. 1965).
55. B.N.A. Act, §§ 92(13), (16), 93.
56. Federal taxing power is expressed in the B.N.A. Act, § 91(3) in these terms: "The
raising of money by any mode or system of taxation"; provincial taxing power is expressed
in § 92(2) in these terms: "Direct taxation within the Province in order to the raising of
a revenue for provincial purposes." By § 92(9) the Provinces are also given power in relation to "shop, saloon tavern, auctioneer and other licenses in order to the raising of a revenue
for provincial, local or municipal purposes." Without going into detail, it is enough to say
that the federal taxing power is dominant because of its unlimited scope.
57. The Royal Commission on Taxation (The Carter Commission) was established
in September, 1962. It has issued a report since this article went to press.
58. In order to satisfy Quebec's claim to minister to universities therein without direct
federal grants, the level of corporation taxes exacted by the federal government was reduced
one per cent in Quebec so as to allow the province to add this to its own exactions.
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tional principle, but it is no less significant on that account. 59 It would be overdrawing the Canadian situation to find a comparison between Canadian federal
reliance on its taxing and spending power for positive social welfare policies and
the power of Congress to tax and spend for the general welfare. 60 The Canadian
power, however fully exercised, could not, on present constitutional doctrine,
underpin a national social security system in the way in which this has been
done by the Congress.
I have painted with bold strokes and have made little allowance for the
shadings which a more detailed picture of our Constitution would show; and I
have probably done equal violence to your Constitution in making the comparisons that I have presented. But despite this, there can be no gainsaying the
differences in our respective approaches to federalism which my comparisons have
highlighted.
59. There have been judicial warnings against "colourable" use of the federal taxing
power but the constitutional power to tax simpliciter is undeniable; and subsequent spending
on a variety of objects has not given rise to legal difficulties: see Laskin, Constitutional Law
666-67 (3d ed. 1966).
60. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, c. 1; see also Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937).

